

Fernando Pessoa

Innateness of the idea of Infinite.

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The argument against innateness is that we reach infinity, and conceive it (as possible) by multiplication of the finite. Of the finite *by what?* By infinity. The idea of infinite is then already supposed. However far we descend, it is still supposed and therefore is innate.

What is a thing in itself? It is a thing such as it is without determination by an intellect. But that which is not determined by anything is indeterminate and therefore infinite. The *ding an sich* has then all the characteristics of the *idea*.

«Things are ideas, their essence being in their perception.» The error of idealists, however, has been to make these ideas belong to the individual «ego», and not, as they do, to the universal «ego», to the atomic mind. By that sin fell Protagoras.

Impossible to think without generalities (Socrates).

Consider the impossibility of considering a hallucination, a vision as of a nature other than the exterior world. How can we see a thing in Space? How can we through a thing out of ourselves?

2 solutions: If things be real then these are no less real since they are seen in the same way. But visions have come to reveal things untrue, hallucinations.

Only solution possible in the ideality, of all things.

Characteristics of the world versus visions:

1. A *universal* «hallucination».
2. A *tactile* «hallucination».

Touch, the primary and essential faculty. Because:

1. There are no cases, nor can there be, of its absence; while there are cases of blindness, of deafness, of inability to smell, of lack of gustation.
2. There are no hallucinations of touch. (Is this true?).

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