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Being and not-Being, in argument, whether as ideas, or as things, are possessed of Being.

Materialism. When M[aterialism] says that the natural argument of the immortality of the soul is wrong, it neglects to analyse what this argument contains. It contains these elements: idea of persistence, idea of a life beyond, (...)

To say, as the materialists say, that man conceives an eternal life because of his horror of death, of extinction is to fall into error. Primarily, man might, as the animal, have an instinct of life without necessarily, say, from it to an eternal life.

When Materialism says man fears extinction does it consider the statement? Does it think that man stands of fear of nothing? [?]

Similarly with Idea of God.

1906?

Textos Filosóficos . Vol. I. Fernando Pessoa. (Estabelecidos e prefaciados por António de Pina Coelho.) Lisboa: Ática, 1968 (imp. 1993): 174.