Notes on Metaphysics

Spirit is consciousness — it is no more, not even is it that which is conscious. Matter is whatever there can be consciousness of, whether this be the sun or the moon or the street which passes by, or an emotion, a desire to love, a fear of pain. Between the love of children and the idea of colour there is a difference; but it is a difference much the same as that between colour and sound. In both cases there is a heterogeneity. The fact that colour and sound are given us by the senses is no argument. There must also be a sense for the perception of emotions — a certain tactus interior. (Or, perchance, fear, love are dependant on the sense of touch. But this is very doubtful.) — Thus we tremble when we feel fear. There is no fear without trembling. Nay, we go further, we hold that the trembling is the fear, just as we hold that the idea is the thing.

It is held that every sensation is at the same time affective and representative, that is, every sensation brings some pleasure or some pain, and every sensation has its own physiognomy proper to it (there is a difference, for instance, between a sensation of colour and a sensation of sound). And if this be true, then a distinction has been made by me of the representative and of the affective, in the distinction between the idea and the sensation.